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Following Frauchiger and Renner’s discovery of a conflict between quantum mechanics and certain
commonsense reasoning axioms, much work has gone into finding alternative axiomatizations that
can avoid the conflict. However, this body of work is largely based on specific interpretations
of quantum mechanics, and at times employs specialized formalism that may be inaccessible to
mainstream quantum information experts. Taking an interpretation-agnostic approach, we propose
a simple operational principle called superpositional solipsism to aid rational agents in making
situational inferences. We show that the principle leads to sound inferences in all operationally-
relevant instances. Along the way, we discuss certain subtleties about the Frauchiger–Renner result
that may have gone hithertofore unnoticed.
I. INTRODUCTION
More than a century after its discovery, quantum me-
chanics arguably remains the most successful theory for
the physical world at the fundamental scale. Yet, it is
perhaps the physical theory that has most stubbornly
eluded the grasp of human intuition. Amongst the en-
during puzzles that quantum mechanics has posed at us,
a certain category can be associated with the distinc-
tive theme of quantum mechanics and intelligent agents.
The history of this category of quantum puzzles goes
back to the pioneering Gedankenexperiment of “Wigner’s
friend” [1].
In more recent times, Frauchiger and Renner (hereafter
“FR”) [2] devised a Gedankenexperiment uncovering
an inconsistency between quantum mechanics and cer-
tain seemingly innocuous commonsense reasoning princi-
ples. FR’s work has been seminal to a growing body
of literature at least partly intended as a response
thereto—favourable at times and critical elsewhere, but
altogether expanding our understanding. Much of this
literature is devoted to finding alternative axiomatiza-
tions of quantum-mechanical reasoning that do not suf-
fer inconsistency in the face of FR-like arguments. In-
deed, FR themselves include in their work suggestions
for ways to defuse the inconsistency within various inter-
pretations1.
Subsequent works have by and large accepted the
soundness of FR’s main theorem as it stands—in par-
ticular, conditional on the manner in which the agents
in the Gedankenexperiment reason. However, a common
critique has been to question the rationality attributed to
these agents, and to suggest that the inconsistency would
be eliminated simply by having the agents reason “truly
rationally”. Of course, it has always been acknowledged,
even by FR, that—ipso facto their theorem—the overall
chain of reasoning by their fictional agent(s) is fallacious.
∗ nvarun@ntu.edu.sg
1 Unless specified otherwise, “interpretation” is here used in the
semi-technical sense of “interpretation of quantum mechanics”.
Rather, one of the central messages of their work (and
of their subsequent responses to critiques) is that an ex-
ercise of localizing the fallacy to any proper part of the
chain is (1) interpretation-dependent in its details and,
furthermore, (2) often not straightforward even within a
single interpretation.
In the present work, we propose a simple operational
principle, which we call superpositional solipsism (SPS),
to inform inferential reasoning by quantum-mechanical
agents. Using the FR Gedankenexperiment as a case
study, we examine SPS in more detail and find that it
provides a prescription for intersubjective inference that
is (1) sound against FR-like arguments, (2) maximally
predictive subject to this soundness, and (3) arguably
interpretation-agnostic in restricting to operational con-
siderations. We highlight a few features that justify and
recommend SPS—some physical, some pragmatic, and
some philosophical.
Before we proceed, we note some important points
about the motivation, content, and scope of our work.
Firstly, while it is inspired and motivated by the lively
debate seeded by FR, our intention is not to register any
particular position in that debate. Rather, we seek—and
claim to have found in SPS—operational principle(s) that
may inform the reasoning of quantum-mechanical agents
in situations like those in the FR Gedankenexperiment.
Notably, SPS does not fit neatly into any of the distinc-
tive roles that FR’s axioms (or substitutes thereof) play;
rather, it functions as a sort of “corrective”, to be applied
in conjunction with other principles.
Secondly, we understand that SPS, and some of the ar-
guments we make for it, may already have been put forth
in some form in the literature. We believe, however, that
the overall collection of ideas and arguments presented
in this work is original and of value to the community,
not least for our commitment to conceptual simplicity.
We will contextually cite all precedent sources of similar
ideas in our knowledge; we regret any inadvertent omis-
sions.
Finally, for the purpose of this work, we commit to a
sort of mind–body nondualism, whereby all thought and
reasoning is assumed to be embodied in physical states.
In this we follow FR and related work. The status of
our arguments in a dualist model may be an interesting
problem for future work.
II. THE FRAUCHIGER–RENNER THEOREM
AND SUBSEQUENT LITERATURE
It will be helpful to set the context with an overview
of FR’s work and the body of literature that it has in-
spired. After reviewing FR’s main theorem, we will sam-
ple a small selection of the subsequent literature, to get
a glimpse of the variety of perspectives from which FR’s
theorem has been analyzed. This section will then help
motivate the need for a simplified operational perspec-
tive, which we hope to bring through our work.
A. The FR framework
At its core, FR’s work concerns three provisional ax-
ioms of quantum-mechanical reasoning that could be em-
ployed by rational agents who are themselves governed by
quantum mechanics2:
(Q) If an agent has established that a quantum system
S is in a pure state |ψ〉 at time t, then they may
infer that a projective measurement of S at time
t, with respect to an orthogonal basis {|ψx〉}dx=1
containing |ψ1〉 = |ψ〉, will yield the outcome x = 1
with certainty. This is a weakened version of the
Born rule for probability assignments to quantum
measurement outcomes.
(C) If an agent A has established that another rational
agent B, with the same prior knowledge as A’s, has
established within the same physical theory as A’s
that x = ξ at time t, then A may “inherit” the
inference that x = ξ at time t.
(S) If an agent has established that x = ξ at time t,
then they must necessarily deny that x 6= ξ at time
t.
Based on an ingenious variation on the “Wigner’s
friend” Gedankenexperiment, FR show the following.
Theorem 1 (Frauchiger and Renner [2018]). Any theory
that satisfies all of the axioms (Q), (C), and (S) neces-
sarily leads agents using it to contradictory inferences.
We will discuss their detailed arguments in Section V,
where we apply our own ideas to their Gedankenexperi-
ment.
Having established their main theorem, FR raised the
question of which of the mutually-inconsistent axioms
2 Here we will state the axioms in semi-formal language, with no
loss of essence from their original, formal formulations.
were upheld by various common interpretations, summa-
rizing their investigation of this question in Table 4 of
their paper. In this connection, they also discussed what
modifications could be made to those of the axioms that
did not hold in a given interpretation. We colloquially
refer to this avenue of research as the FR framework.
B. The post-FR intellectual landscape
FR’s discussion with regard to the status of their provi-
sional axioms in various extant interpretations has since
been supplemented by others’ work that has given de-
tailed interpretation-specific accounts [3–10], addressed
the issue in the language of formal logical systems [11,
12], examined the FR theorem in connection with the
philosophical underpinnings of science [13], and alto-
gether advanced a vast variety of frontiers in light of the
theorem.
This is but a very small sample of the literature in this
area, and does not even consider the experimental work.
Nevertheless, we find the discourse to be dominated by
interpretation-based accounts, and in places technically
arcane. We therefore perceive a need for a treatment that
combines bare-bones operationality with a simplicity of
formalism. We will expand on this in the next section.
III. TOWARDS A SIMPLE OPERATIONAL
APPROACH
A burgeoning of diverse literature in a newly-emergent
avenue bodes well for the associated disciplines. Never-
theless, it could be unsettling to some—it is to us—that
the body of literature inspired by FR does not seem to be
converging towards a scientific consensus on such ques-
tions as FR’s titular “Can quantum theory consistently
describe the use of itself?”. Besides, much of this liter-
ature studies axiomatic systems that may explicitly in-
clude interpretational details (such as ascribing definite-
ness to indirectly inferred events). Such study is un-
doubtedly of value in its own right. However, it may be
argued that questions such as the one above are better
addressed in an interpretation-agnostic framework.
The bare formalism of quantum mechanics (henceforth
“quantum mechanics”), consisting of Schro¨dinger’s equa-
tion together with Born’s rule, is operationally testable
and has stood the test. On the other hand, the various
interpretations of quantum mechanics, which build upon
the latter, have been operationally indistinguishable thus
far. They may remain so at least for the foreseeable fu-
ture for technological reasons, if not forever for funda-
mental reasons [14, 15].
In the present work we seek operational principle(s) to
help agents subject to quantum mechanics reason. We
argue that such a prescription must be based only on the
operationally-relevant part—namely, quantum mechan-
ics—of whatever quantum-based theory the agents live
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and reason under. That is, in a world actually governed
by any interpretation, an agent subscribing to any inter-
pretation must be able to use the principle(s) soundly and
intersubjectively with other agents subscribing to their
own favourite interpretations. Of course, it is possible
that quantum mechanics does not uniquely determine an
operational reasoning framework; the principle we pro-
pose here is offered as merely one possible option.
Another issue we perceive in this connection is that
many expositions employ technical machinery (modal
logic, quantum histories, pilot waves, etc.) that are rel-
atively unfamiliar to researchers in the mainstream of
quantum information science, such as it is. The vari-
ous formal representations of quantum mechanics, equiv-
alent in their operational import, can all be described es-
sentially interchangeably as “the formalism of quantum
mechanics”. However, the one we use here is arguably
the de facto lingua franca in quantum information. In
proposing an operational principle that looks simple in
this language, we hope to contribute to the accessibility
of the topic in this broad field.
In light of its distinctly interpretation-agnostic motiva-
tion as laid out above, our work may be regarded as be-
longing not in the FR framework proper, but in a closely-
allied avenue, albeit inspired by the former. It is almost
certainly far from the first such work in the vast body of
post-FR literature.
IV. THE PRINCIPLE OF SUPERPOSITIONAL
SOLIPSISM
We are now ready to present our operational princi-
ple. We intend it as a corrective or amendment to be
applied on every use of FR’s Axiom (Q) or (C), in a
manner that will become clear as we discuss. Focusing
on operationally-relevant elements of formalism, we do
not concern ourselves with their Axiom (S).
Consider a primitive case where our prospective prin-
ciple could be put to test: an agent Alice, inhabiting
a quantum system A, is trying to reason in a situation
involving a qubit system S. First, Alice uses a trusted
device to prepare S in the pure state
|ψ〉S :=
1√
2
(|0〉S + |1〉S) , (1)
whose description is known to Alice. They then use an-
other qubit, M, to perform a projective measurement on
S in the {|0〉 , |1〉} basis, and then observe the outcome.
To keep things simple, as in [2], we assume that Alice’s
state upon having observed either outcome is pure. Thus,
the overall state of Alice and the two qubits at this point
has the form3
|φ〉SMA :=
1√
2
(|0〉S |0〉M |zero〉A + |1〉S |1〉M |one〉A) .
(2)
As with Wigner’s friend, suppose it were agreed before-
hand between Alice and their friend Bob that the latter
was to now perform a (previously agreed-upon) projec-
tive measurement on the composite system SMA.
How must Alice reason about the outcome of the im-
pending measurement? An obvious option would be to
simply apply Born’s rule, e.g. as formulated in FR’s
Axiom (Q)4, on the overall experimental design. This
would, of course, yield operationally-sound and maxi-
mally-informative predictions from an apriori perspec-
tive on the experiment, namely that the outcome is com-
pletely random, with each of the two possible values oc-
curring with a probability 1/2.
However, one would hope that Alice’s special epis-
temic circumstance in having observed a specific outcome
should give them some predictive edge over the apriori
perspective. To inform such situational reasoning, we in-
troduce our principle of superpositional solipsism (SPS):
Axiom (SPS). An agent must always reason based on
the assumption that their current observational state is
definite and not superposed or mixed with other potential
states, which the agent does not currently experience.
Clause 1 (Observational state). The “observational
state” of an agent includes all definite values that the
agent has determined for observables external to the agent
through all the measurements they have performed thus
far, as well as all mental / internal representations of
such definite values, that the agent knows they possess.
Note. While we extend the scope of SPS to disregard
both coherent superpositions and incoherent mixtures in
agents’ reasoning, the former has a more important in-
fluence on the outcomes of rational inferences; hence the
name we have chosen for the principle.
In the remainder, we will continue to state such clauses
to clarify SPS. Coming back to the example at hand,
Alice’s observational state notably includes the piece of
classical information “zero” or “one” concerning the mea-
surement outcome they observed. Here, one might won-
der, what if we express the very same state |φ〉SMA as
3 Although we use a many-worlds–like calculus where a measure-
ment is modelled as an entangling unitary process involving the
measurement device and the measured system, our description
can be translated to a collapse-based formalism, or indeed, any
formal representation of quantum mechanics.
4 The validity of (Q) is conditional on implicit physical and meta-
physical assumptions, an assortment of which may be found in
[2, 5, 11]. Of course, no such assortment can be deemed defini-
tively complete; in this work we do not contest these implicit
assumptions.
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|φ〉SMA =
1
2
[∣∣Φ+〉
SM
(|zero〉A + |one〉A) +
∣∣Φ−〉
SM
(|zero〉A − |one〉A)
]
, (3)
where |Φ±〉SM := 1√2 (|0〉S |0〉M ± |1〉S |1〉M)? Could one
not argue then that the states 1√
2
(|zero〉A ± |one〉A) are
equally valid as “definite observational states”, indicating
the “observation” of |Φ±〉SM on SM?
This is where the clause “that the agent knows they
possess” is important: for agents like us humans, ob-
servational states include elements of self-awareness that
comprise redundant copies of certain pieces of classical
information such as the value “zero”. More generally,
in all agents that have an internal mechanism to mul-
tiply (necessarily classical) information into redundant
copies, one can define the definite observational states as
those that correspond to definite values of such copiable
information. An instance of the application of SPS can
then be described as a formal decoherence with respect to
the “preferred” or “classical” basis of the agent’s inter-
nal states (by “formal” we mean that this decoherence
only needs to be applied by the agent in their mental
representation of the situation).
For more general agents (e.g. quantum computers),
which fundamentally lack fixed preferred bases, it may
still be possible to define an effective classical basis in a
particular situation where the agent is to make an infer-
ence. We will expand on this (and on general POVM-
based and weak measurements) later in Section VE; for
now, we will take as given that any specific instance
where SPS is to be applied, i.e. where an agent is to
make inferences, comes with a well-defined notion of def-
inite observational states. Importantly, the framework in
which FR’s Gedankenexperiment is cast implicitly con-
tains such a notion, and even so, the sort of questions
considered by FR and subsequent literature are evidently
nontrivial to answer.
Where does all this lead our Alice? Let us suppose that
Bob’s measurement is relative to a basis that contains the
vectors |0〉S |0〉M |zero〉A and |1〉S |1〉M |one〉A. Based on
SPS, Alice would predict that Bob would certainly get
the same outcome as Alice. This prediction would, of
course, never go wrong in this simple case. Thus, in this
case, Alice would not reason unsoundly in ignoring the
superposition; on the contrary, they earn an operational
advantage by applying SPS instead of taking an apriori
perspective on the experiment.
But what about cases where Bob is to make a differ-
ent measurement? Surely, in these cases Alice would be
misled by disregarding the superposition?
Observation 2 (Operational immunity of predictive
power). If Alice is a wilful subject in an experiment that
by design depends on a superposition of certain prede-
termined definite observational states of theirs, or that
otherwise involves absolute control of their cognitive ap-
paratus by Bob, then
1. Alice effectively cedes all rational agency for the du-
ration of the relevant coherent part of the experi-
ment.
2. Even if the agents do prescribe an inferential sys-
tem for Alice, any instance in the experiment of
such a system’s situational application is necessar-
ily scripted into the experiment’s design, and as
such, plays no role as an inferential aid.
3. In order to script such inference into the experi-
mental design, the agents would anyway have had
to execute the inference’s line of reasoning in ad-
vance, obtaining then and there whatever insight
was to be gained from it; in this prior reasoning,
they could employ quantum mechanics in its full
predictive power.
In particular, enforcing SPS on Alice’s situational rea-
soning would result in no loss of predictive power.
It is worth while to expand on points 2 and 3 above to
preempt some potential misunderstandings. Firstly, in
response to our claim that a pre-scripted inference does
not function as an inferential aid, one might object thus:
In the deterministic (i.e. not stochastic) classical com-
puting model, the hardware and program together com-
pletely determine the outcome of an instance of compu-
tation. In this sense, the outcome can be considered to
have been “present all along” in the hardware–program
composite, existing as a foregone conclusion regardless of
whether an actual process of computation is carried out.
Would we then also deem such a process as functionally
not an inferential aid, thereby summarily trivializing the
value of deterministic classical computation?
Not so: we would in fact draw an important distinction
between deterministic classical computation and the kind
of “scripting” mentioned in point 2. In the former model,
one may write a program to, say, compute the first ten
digits of the decimal expansion of pi. In doing so, one is
rationally certain that executing the program will result
in a predetermined outcome, and that this outcome will
coincide with the formal definition of “the desired dig-
its of pi” that one can accept without actually knowing
the digits. Crucially, one does not need to have explic-
itly computed the outcome in advance by other means in
order to write the program in the first place; if they did,
then the program would indeed be functionally useless.
On the other hand, in an experiment like Alice and
Bob’s above, or like the FR Gedankenexperiment, which
we will discuss in Section V, measurements with respect
to superpositions of definite observational states are part
of the design. Engineering such measurements, in turn,
requires the agents to know the relevant observational
states in detail. Quantum mechanics forbids one to de-
termine the detailed state of a system through any single
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observation5, and so e.g. Bob couldn’t just wait for Al-
ice to get into the entangled state |φ〉SMA of Eq. 2 and
then, upon their first encounter with this state, manage
to perform a measurement with respect to it or another
superposed state. They would have to first get Alice into
the exact same state a large number of times, perform
various measurements, and thereby learn the details of
Alice’s definite observational states to a sufficient degree
of precision. Only then would they be able to perform the
measurement desired in the actual planned experiment.
Clearly, in this process Bob would already have had
occasion to note the outcomes of Alice’s inferences in
the prospective actual experiment. This is what we al-
luded to in point 3, and thus the sort of inferences made
by agents in Alice’s situation are truly operationally use-
less : not because the outcomes are predetermined by the
setup, but because one needs to know the outcomes in
advance to even build the setup.
Another interesting point in this connection, which has
received some attention in [2, 11], is the following: if Al-
ice was rational in their considerations before agreeing
to subject themselves to such an experiment, they would
also be wise to the operational unreliability of any mem-
ory they will later retain of the experiment—even ones
of inferences they made during the experiment. There-
fore, should Alice remember making in-experiment situ-
ational inferences that since turned out to be refuted by
the eventual experimental outcome, they have no reason
to be embarrassed or charged with fallacious reasoning
(unless they insist on taking their memories seriously);
we will revisit this point in Section VF.
Yet, we emphasize that the unreliability of memories of
such an inferential action is not the reason the action it-
self must not be considered a reliable inference: in view of
the “scripting” arguments above, it is not the inference’s
reliability that is in question, but rather its very “infer-
enceness”. For contrast, consider an agent who is in a
position to make a sound situational inference and also
apply it situationally, in true possession of their agency.
Say the agent also knows that they will later lose the
fidelity of their memory of the inference. In this case,
the inference could be deemed unreliable outside of the
situation, owing to the unreliability of its memory.
However, in cases where cognitive volition itself is ab-
sent, and where moreover the outcomes of ostensible in-
ferences are known in advance, such actions are not to
be deemed reliable inferences, simply because they aren’t
even inferences. In fact, experiments that rely on such ac-
tions rob the subordinate agents not only of the freedom
to reason, but also of the freedom to abstain from rea-
soning! As such, these actions are not worthy of scrutiny
with regard to their soundness as inferences. Hence,
5 Moreover, even a single observation, besides divulging only a
small amount of information about the state of the system,
pushes the system out of the state it was in before the mea-
surement.
echoing the concluding remark of Observation 2, applying
SPS does not compromise the predictive power of actions
that can truly operationally be considered inferences.
This is almost surprisingly reassuring in the face of the
apparent radical reductionism of SPS. But what recourse
do agents have, if they wish to retain true situational
rational agency during such an experiment?
Observation 3 (Pragmatism regarding situational ra-
tional agency). If Alice retains any part of their cogni-
tive apparatus, however small, outside of Bob’s control
and employs it in volitional situational reasoning, they
invalidate a commensurate coherent element of the ex-
periment by that very act, and consequently don’t have to
take this element into consideration for their reasoning.
FR do note that their paradoxical prediction would fail
if any information leaked from the coherent control of
their Gedankenexperiment’s superagents; this point has
since been examined in more detail in later work [16].
However, the need to engineer (as part of the experimen-
tal design) specific inferential chains into the cognitive
machinery of the measured agents has either been im-
plicitly assumed, or else escaped the authors’ notice; we
will expand on this in Section V.
Here, it is important to note that we need make no
assumptions of the agents’ being macroscopic or complex,
their observational states’ being technologically infeasible
to superpose, etc. Observation 3 becomes relevant even
in cases where an agent retains agency over so much as
but a single qubit of their cognitive faculty outside of the
controlled experiment, however large and complex the
controlled part may be.
Failing such retention of agency, an ostensibly infer-
ence-like action that is, for whatever reason, scripted
into the experimental design might as well obey SPS.
In fact, we take a more radical stance and argue that
SPS would only be the pragmatic way even to script
inferences: in the event that an agent strays from the
script—inadvertently, mutinously, or for other unforeseen
reasons—a commitment to SPS at least ensures that the
decoherence resulting from the transgression coincides
with the SPS-based formal decoherence in the agent’s
reasoning, and therefore that the information that gets
unplannedly leaked acts in favour of validating any sit-
uational inference the agent makes. We will make this
argument more concrete in Section V, but in anticipa-
tion of it, we have the following.
Clause 2 (Overriding superpositional design). Where
there is potential conflict, an agent must in their reason-
ing uphold SPS over superpositional elements that they
know to be part of the experimental design.
Sometimes, an agent could be subject to an experi-
ment that involves measurements with respect to some
superposed observational states but does not prescribe
(or engineer) any particular observational states on the
agent; indeed, such experiments are already being con-
ducted, with the aim of advancing our understanding of
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human cognition. In such cases, SPS is even more self-ev-
idently applicable than in the aforementioned scenarios
where specific observational states are required by design.
What about cases where a “malevolent superagent”
operates on an agent’s cognitive machinery without the
latter’s knowledge?
Observation 4 (Pragmatism regarding unfalsifiable
branches). The hypothesis that the wavefunction of an
agent’s world contains, in addition to a branch corre-
sponding to the agent’s current definite observational
state, a superposition with other branches, in a manner
unknown to or unanticipated by the agent, is fundamen-
tally unfalsifiable. Therefore, the agent would only be
pragmatic in ascribing no credence to this hypothesis.
The operational standing of such a hypothesis is spiri-
tually akin to that of the hypothesis that one is a Boltz-
mann brain, or that one lives in a superdeterministic
world. Pragmatism against such hypotheses has been
supported on rigorous grounds in recent work by Mu¨ller
[17], as part of a radically solipsistic approach to physics.
Indeed, we humans have been practicing pragmatism
against the hypothesis of unknown branches of the wave-
function throughout the history of our use of quantum
mechanics; we could scarcely do without it. What is no-
table here is that SPS effectively extends this attitude
even to branches that we expect to be present but do not
currently experience.
To summarize this section: we introduced the prin-
ciple of superpositional solipsism (SPS), which broadly
prescribes that rational agents commit to a “formal col-
lapse” to their current observational state for the pur-
pose of drawing inferences. We showed that SPS can
be applied in conjunction with FR’s Axiom (Q) without
compromising agents’ predictive power, but on the con-
trary sometimes improving it. We also elucidated the
operational simplicity of SPS in not prescribing different
courses of action in the face of diverse forms of obser-
vational superposition—with known or unknown super-
agents, and in the presence or absence of specification in
what the measured agents are required to do.
Moving on, we must investigate how SPS works to-
gether with Axiom (C), which concerns situations where
agents reason from their mental reconstructions of other
agents’ perspectives. For a complete treatment of this
aspect, we will need more complex situations than what
the Alice–Bob experiment above affords. In the upcom-
ing section we will use FR’s Gedankenexperiment as our
test case to examine (C) as well as to uncover a few more
interesting implications of SPS.
V. A DEEPER INVESTIGATION OF THE
PRINCIPLE
Building on the previous section’s insights into the
principle of superpositional solipsism (SPS), here we will
probe the principle more thoroughly. To this end, it
will be helpful to apply it to FR’s Gedankenexperiment,
which features situations more complex than the simple
Alice–Bob Gedankenexperiment above.
FR’s Gedankenexperiment, an extension of “Wigner’s
friend”, involves four agents, whom they call F, F, W,
andW—two friends and, presumably, two Wigners (Mar-
git and Eugene, say). We provide a detailed description
of the Gedankenexperiment in Appendix II. Here, we pro-
ceed by first summarizing how FR use it to derive their
main result, Theorem 1. Thereafter, we will scrutinize
their arguments through the lens of our SPS principle.
This will enable us to (1) identify certain critical fallacies
in the reasoning of the hypothetical agents; (2) illustrate
how to apply SPS in conjunction with FR’s Axiom (C);
and (3) afford some more insight into the operational im-
plications of SPS.
A. FR’s arguments
Upon some examination of the experiment, one finds
that W has a nonzero probability of obtaining the out-
come w = ok in any given round. Consider an instance
where they do obtain this outcome, and say they then
wish to predict the outcome w of W’s subsequent mea-
surement. The form of the overall state of all relevant
systems at this point in the experiment, Eq. (A4), shows
that the outcome w = ok is exclusive of the outcome
z = − 1
2
of F’s measurement. Therefore, W may reason
that F must have obtained z = 1
2
.
At this juncture, one straightforward line of reasoning
W can take is to invoke Axiom (Q) and infer that, in
the next step of the experiment, W will obtain outcome
w = ok with probability 1/2; this inference is indeed vin-
dicated from our detached point of view, which can be
seen as an application of (Q) to the overall experiment.
However, the stated axioms leave other lines of reason-
ing open to W. For example, they may put themself in
F’s shoes and imagine what the latter would have ratio-
nally inferred from z = 1
2
(which by now is established
from W’s perspective). They may then invoke (C) to in-
herit F’s presumed inference. The question, then, is: how
would F have reasoned upon getting the outcome z = 1
2
?
F, too, could just invoke (Q) on their own lab to infer
(what we know to be) the correct expected outcome of the
experiment. Alternately, from the form (A3) of the state
after their measurement, F could deduce that z = 1
2
is
inconsistent with r = heads, and that, therefore, r must
be tails. They may then proceed to invoke (C) to reason
on F’s behalf in light of r = tails.
What would F have concluded from this outcome?
Based on the form (A2) of the state post F’s measure-
ment, a straightforward application of (Q) would lead
them to predict that w = fail with certainty. Extract-
ing this hypothetical inference through the two nested
layers of (C), W may thus predict that w = fail with cer-
tainty. This prediction, however, is in conflict with W’s
conclusion from reasoning by (Q) alone, which admits
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the nonzero probability 1/2 for w = ok to occur; at any
rate, the certain-fail prediction is bound to eventually be
manifestly invalidated on some round of the experiment.
This already appears to establish inconsistency in any
axiomatic system that includes (Q) and (C) (note that
Table 4 of FR does not provide evidence that any theory
can really uphold even these two axioms simultaneously).
FR, however, reason that W and their friends may restore
consistency by admitting the possibility for a quantity
like w to take multiple values simultaneously.
As an aside, we remark that even in theories that vi-
olate (S), consistency with (Q) would, to the best of
our knowledge, preclude the “many simultaneous val-
ues” construct from helping in cases where quantum me-
chanics predicts one value with certainty. Nevertheless,
to close this presumed loophole, FR also explicate Ax-
iom (S) and direct their main theorem only at axiomatic
systems that include all three axioms.
Having thus seen how FR argue for Theorem 1, we will
now apply our principle to their Gedankenexperiment.
B. An operational assessment of FR
We first note that FR’s outermost narrative does not
disclose whether, or in what manner, F and F reason.
It only discusses how W reasons; as part of this reason-
ing, W imagines how F might reason. Even further out,
FR’s description of F’s reasoning is part of the imagined
narrative of W’s imagined F. Setting aside this nested
structure for now, we will first scrutinize each agent’s
reasoning chain as though it took place in FR’s outer-
most narrative.
Let us start with F, who takes the simplest line of
reasoning: F reasons, upon getting the outcome “tails”
and preparing S in the state |→〉S, that the state of L just
before W’s eventual measurement will be |fail〉L. Based
on this, F concludes that W will obtain the outcome w =
ok. In this case, F actually adheres to SPS in disregarding
the branch where they obtained the outcome “heads” in
the state |ψ〉RDFS [Eq. (A2)].
In the language of Section IV, however, F’s reason-
ing action (if any) is scripted into the experimental de-
sign—they are, after all, to be measured later by W. As
such, any judgement of the soundness of this action as
an inference is operationally meaningless; for now we will
content ourselves with the observation that the inference
adheres to SPS, but later we will explore how stronger
judgements could be made.
Moving on to the slightly more complex inferential
chain imputed to F, the latter’s first relevant inference
is upon seeing the outcome z = 1
2
to their measurement:
they reason that this outcome, being incompatible with
r = heads, signals that F must have obtained r = tails.
In this step F, too, upholds SPS. They then invoke Ax-
iom (C) to “summon their inner F”, whom they imagine
in the state of having obtained r = tails.
F reasons, as noted above, on the basis of the outer-
most experimental design. In particular, as one of the
steps in their chain of reasoning, F infers that the state
of L just before W’s measurement will be |fail〉L. This
inference would adhere to SPS if the real F situationally
carried it out. However, such an inference on the part of
the figmental F in real F’s imagination would run afoul
of F’s commitment to SPS: it would result in F consider-
ing themselves to be in the state |fail〉L, a superposition
that includes observational states other than the one they
currently experience. After this step, F bases all of their
subsequent reasoning on the assumption that they are in
the superposition state. Again, the status of F’s action
as a bonafide inference—sound or fallacious—aside, we
note that their overall line of reasoning violates SPS.
Moving on to W: their probabilistic prediction for w
based solely on (Q) applied to their current observational
state upon seeing w = ok, as well as their inference
that z = 1
2
, adheres to SPS. However, their reasoning
chain based on z = 1
2
and the nested applications of
(C) violates SPS. To wit, when W inherits their imag-
ined F’s inference that r = tails, they must carefully
consider the implications: reasoning based on a com-
mitment to r = tails would cause them to ascribe to
themselves the state 1√
2
(∣∣fail〉
LEW
−
∣∣ok〉
LEW
)
, thereby
positing branches whose observational states they don’t
currently experience.
Unlike F and F, W does have the freedom to reason
as they please, without affecting the outcome of the ex-
periment. W’s reasoning can therefore be judged on its
merit, and we see that it is both unsound (as found by
FR) and in contradiction with SPS (as we found).
Of the diverse possible ways to “localize the fallacy”
in the agents’ reasoning, an SPS-based analysis localizes
it to W’s inference that r = tails. Thus, while their pre-
vious inference z = 1
2
is vindicated, as is their (Q)-based
probabilistic prediction for w, their line of reasoning from
r = tails onwards rests on flawed grounds. In addition,
if W’s imagined inferences on behalf of F and F are ac-
tually scripted as such into the experimental design, SPS
would also find fault in F’s reasoning. We merely note
this in passing, and do not believe that the “flaw-localiz-
ing” exercise has any operational significance in general.
We saw some indications above that intersubjective
reasoning informed by (C) can conflict with SPS. In order
to retain as much as possible of the power of (C), we add
the following clause.
Clause 3 (Intersubjective inference). When using Ax-
iom (C) for intersubjective inference, an agent must add
the definiteness of their own current observational state
to the premises underlying the imagined reasoning of all
other agents.
For example, if the real F invokes (C) to reason on F’s
behalf, they must imagine that F ascribes to L the state∣∣1
2
〉
L
. This way, they would not inherit the real F’s pre-
diction “w = fail”. Upon close examination, one finds
that (C) is really no more helpful than (Q): the latter
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could just as well be used by an agent to infer (based on
their knowledge of the experimental design) the values
of unobserved observables from definite values of observ-
ables they have already determined (i.e. contents of their
current definite observational state). The definite val-
ues constituting their premise may be determiners of the
states of external systems; for the purpose of such infer-
ence, there is no reason to distinguish between external
systems with and without agency.
But if an agent should consider how another agent
might have reasoned, Clause 3 of SPS effectively exhorts
them to uphold their own perspective over the other’s in
the event of a conflict; in this sense, Clause 3 is just a spe-
cial case of Clause 2. Based on this prescription, an agent
might think along the lines of “My friend would certainly
have inferred x = ξ based on their perspective, and they
were sound in reasoning so; however, if my perspective
informs me that x 6= ξ, I must uphold the latter.” In a
generic instance, inferences drawn by applying (C) on an-
other agent’s independent perspective would include ones
that do not conflict with one’s own definite observational
state (e.g. W’s use of (Q) to predict the probabilistic w
outcome from their previous inference that F must have
seen z = 1
2
). Such inferences would, of course, remain
valid under the constraints imposed by SPS.
C. Virtual disclosure and transmissive stability
In classical mechanics, virtual displacement and vir-
tual work are formal abstractions that can be used to de-
rive equations that govern the actual dynamics of phys-
ical systems. Here, we will propose a similar abstrac-
tion—virtual disclosure—to help in the operational as-
sessment of inferences.
Claim 5 (Virtual disclosure). Consider an experiment
featuring an agent who, with prior knowledge of the de-
tailed experimental design, performs an inference-like ac-
tion. Suppose that, just after the agent performed this
action, the experimental design were temporarily violated
by copying the agent’s observational state onto a system
external to the experiment. Suppose further that the ex-
periment were otherwise carried out as designed. Then,
1. If the action was not already a true operational in-
ference in the sense of Section IV, it is elevated to
that status by the (unplanned) copying action.
2. The resulting inference is sound if and only if it
adheres to SPS.
We could summarize this principle of virtual disclosure
as follows: “An inference-like action that is not a true
operational inference adheres to SPS if and only if it is
elevated to a sound operational inference by a virtual dis-
closure.” Note that the “copying” embodying the virtual
disclosure is defined relative to the relevant “classical ba-
sis” or “basis of definite observational states”, and there-
fore results in a decoherence relative to this basis when
only systems internal to the experiment are considered.
We will leave the formalization and rigorous proof of
this claim (including the formalization of such terms as
“true operational inference”) for future work, but here
present intuitive arguments for it. The case where the in-
ference concerns something unrelated to the experiment
is uninteresting and trivial. Moving on to the case where
the inference pertains to the experiment and its out-
comes, there are two salient sub-cases: (1) the inferential
action has no influence on the experiment’s outcome; (2)
the action does influence the experiment’s outcome. In
case (1), the experiment cannot possibly be one involv-
ing the superposition of different observational states of
the agent; therefore, the agent would reason soundly by
committing to the definite values they have determined
for observables.
In case (2), if the action’s influence on the experiment’s
outcome was through a coherent superposition with other
observational states, then (as noted above) the disclosure
would break the requisite coherence. In the resulting
decohered version of the experiment, if no other design
feature were violated, then again the agent would reason
soundly based on the definite values they observed. This
shows the “if” part. We will provide evidence for the
“only if” direction presently.
If the action impinged on the outcome in a different
way, not involving coherent superposition, then SPS per
se—whose dictate solely concerns unobserved superposi-
tions—is not likely to preclude a proper consideration of
the relevant premises. We therefore expect the claim to
be valid even for this case, but confirming this would re-
quire careful formalization. One category of problematic
cases is of inferences whose conclusions are self-referen-
tial, e.g. “This statement is a secret between Alice and
Bob”, “This statement has been uttered an even number
of times”, etc.
We could try to exclude such problematic cases from
the scope of our claim by restricting it to inferences whose
conclusions have the property that their truth value is
invariant when they are transmitted or copied from one
system to another. This property, which may be called
transmissive stability, could possibly be used (after ap-
propriate formalization) as a definition for “true oper-
ational inference”. The science of formal languages and
logical systems might already have formalizations of such
notions, and we hope to explore relevant connections in
future work.
As promised above, we will now present some argu-
ments for the “only if” part of Claim 5 in the case where
the inferential action influences the experimental out-
come for reasons related to coherent superposition. The
FR Gedankenexperiment contains just such instances,
and so we will base our arguments on these.
We have already seen that F’s reasoning adheres to
SPS. As such, it would not help us probe the “only if”
direction. Nevertheless, it is worth while to apply the
virtual disclosure principle to it as a test case of the “if”
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part. Suppose that F obtained r=tails, prepared S in the
state |→〉S, and then made the following inferences:
1. S is in the state |→〉S; therefore the state of L just
before W’s measurement will be |fail〉L.
2. Owing to the above state of L, W will certainly
obtain w = fail upon their measurement.
A disclosure after either of these steps can effectively be
modelled by preceding W’s measurement by the following
isometry:
∣∣h〉
L
7→ |0〉G
∣∣h〉
L
;∣∣t〉
L
7→ |1〉G
∣∣t〉
L
, (4)
where G is a qubit external to the experiment. Following
the rest of the experiment as per design, we eventually
reach the state
√
1
12
|0〉G
(∣∣ok〉
LEW
+
∣∣fail〉
LEW
)
(|ok〉LEW + |fail〉LEW) +
√
1
3
|1〉G
(∣∣fail〉
LEW
−
∣∣ok〉
LEW
) |fail〉LEW . (5)
The external flag |1〉G, which signals F’s inferences lead-
ing to the conclusion “w = fail with certainty”, does in
fact necessitate the actual outcome w = fail. Thus, SPS-
adherence renders F’s reasoning sound under virtual dis-
closure. Note also that F’s disclosed conclusion possesses
transmissive stability and could, therefore, be broadcast
indefinitely without affecting its factuality.
Moving on to the interesting case of F’s reasoning, the
latter consists of the following inferences (upon getting
the outcome z = 1
2
):
1. z = 1
2
; therefore F must certainly have observed
r = tails.
2. F has observed r = tails; therefore, they must
certainly have concluded, “W will certainly obtain
w = fail upon their measurement.”
3. F reasoned soundly in predicting so; by (C), I must
predict likewise; therefore, W will certainly obtain
w = fail upon their measurement.
As we did with F, let us virtually disclose F’s inference
by preceding W’s measurement by the isometry∣∣− 1
2
〉
L
7→ |0〉G
∣∣− 1
2
〉
L
;∣∣1
2
〉
L
7→ |1〉G
∣∣ 1
2
〉
L
. (6)
Playing out the rest of the original experiment, we have
the eventual state
√
1
3
|0〉G
∣∣fail〉
LEW
(|ok〉LEW + |fail〉LEW) +
√
1
12
|1〉G
(∣∣ok〉
LEW
−
∣∣fail〉
LEW
)
(|ok〉LEW − |fail〉LEW) . (7)
In this case, the virtual disclosure flag |1〉G signaling F’s
inferences fails to uphold their final conclusion. It is in-
structive to consider what would happen if W had mea-
sured in the
{∣∣h〉
L
,
∣∣t〉
L
}
basis instead: the virtual disclo-
sure would in fact then vindicate F’s first two inferences,
although the final one would still fail. Of course, this
happens to be the one inference that conflicts with SPS,
which the first two adhere to.
Thus, the virtual disclosure exercise applied on F’s rea-
soning chain provides support for both the “if” and the
“only if” directions of Claim 5. Again, all of F’s inferred
statements (including the false one) possess transmissive
stability: their truth values remain invariant under trans-
mission.
As for W, their reasoning does not need to be examined
by virtual disclosure—it is subject to actual disclosure in
the outermost, operational layer of the experiment, and
all its inferred statements are transmissively stable. We
have already seen that exactly those of their inferences
that adhere to SPS are borne out by empirical evidence.
In Section IV, we used the simple Alice–Bob Gedan-
kenexperiment to illustrate that SPS-based reasoning can
make more informative predictions than reasoning based
on superposed observational states that are not directly
experienced. In this section, based on the more complex
FR Gedankenexperiment, we have presented arguments
supporting the stronger Claim 5: if true, this would
mean that neglecting SPS could lead not only to pos-
sible diminution in predictive power, but also to the loss
of soundness.
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D. No-signalling and operational completeness of
the wavefunction
The FR Gedankenexperiment exhibits some more cu-
rious quirks of quantum-mechanical reasoning that are
easy to miss at first glance. One of these concerns op-
erations that commute under the formalism of quantum
mechanics.
Recall our critical assessment of W’s reasoning in Sec-
tion VB, where we argued that their assignment of the
state
∣∣t〉
L
to F’s lab would lead them to the SPS-violat-
ing assignment 1√
2
(∣∣fail〉
LEW
−
∣∣ok〉
LEW
)
to their own
state. The reasoning chain makes its way ostensibly via
an inference regarding F’s lab L. Notice, however, that
W’s measurement of L commutes with F’s actions. As far
as quantum mechanics is concerned, W might as well be
making their inferences independently of what transpires
on the L side of the story. With this perspective, we see
plainly that W’s inference amounts to the absurdity “My
measurement found L to be in the state
∣∣ok〉
L
; therefore,
L must have been in the state
∣∣t〉
L
.”
This idea of commuting operations can be extended to
uncover closely-related fallacies [18] in (C)-based reason-
ing:
Observation 6 (Operational fallacies in reasoning based
on (C)). The state |φ〉LL [Eq. (A3)] of L ≡ RDF and
L ≡ SDF can also be prepared through the following steps:
1. F first prepares S in the state
√
1
3
|↑〉S +
√
2
3
|↓〉S.
2. F then uses D to measure S in the {|↑〉S , |↓〉S} basis,
and makes a mental note of the outcome.
3. If the outcome is ↑, F prepares R in the state
|tails〉R; if the outcome is ↓, F prepares R in the
state
√
1
2
(|heads〉R + |tails〉R).
4. F sends R to F.
5. F uses D to measure R in the {|heads〉R , |tails〉R}
basis, and makes a mental note of the outcome.
Overall, this preparation can be summarized through the
rendering |φ〉LL =
√
1
3
∣∣t〉
L
∣∣ 1
2
〉
L
+
√
2
3
∣∣fail〉
L
∣∣− 1
2
〉
L
of the
same state. In this case, F would infer from
∣∣ 1
2
〉
L
, pre-
dictively, that L will later be in the state
∣∣t〉
L
, as they do
retrodictively in the original Gedankenexperiment. But
what would they then proceed to predict, based on (C)
applied on the future F? They are now faced with a
quandary:
1. If F predicts that their own lab will later be in the
state |fail〉L, then they must admit that F’s action
has an influence on L that violates the no-signalling
principle.
2. Alternately, if F predicts that their own lab will re-
main in the state
∣∣1
2
〉
L
, then they must admit that
(C) prescribes different lines of reasoning from the
same state, based on different preparations.
On the other hand, applying (C) constrained by SPS
allows F to make the latter prediction under both prepa-
rations, thereby averting both fallacies.
E. Effective classical bases for quantum agents
For the purpose of the many puzzles related to the
FR Gedankenexperiment, it was quite adequate for us to
consider agents who have well-defined “definite observa-
tional states” or “classical bases”. Here we will briefly
speculate on how SPS could be extended to inform the
reasoning of truly quantum agents, e.g. quantum com-
puters. Let us begin by asking ourselves, “How would W
have reasoned, if they were a quantum computer?”
While a human W would be limited to reasoning based
on the particular basis in which they have already ob-
served L, a quantum computer would have the option to
simply undo this measurement and use a more informa-
tive one (if the experimental design insisted on imple-
menting the given measurement before starting to rea-
son)! In this case, considering once again the state |φ〉LL
[Eq. (A3)], re-expressed as
√
1
6
∣∣h〉
L
|ok〉L +
√
5
6
(√
1
5
∣∣h〉
L
+
√
4
5
∣∣t〉
L
)
|fail〉L ,
(8)
we see that the optimal way for W to make error-
free predictions about w is to perform an unambiguous
state discrimination protocol between the states
∣∣h〉
L
and√
1
5
∣∣h〉
L
+
√
4
5
∣∣t〉
L
. This would result in three mutu-
ally-exclusive cases, leading respectively to the following
inferences:
1. L is not in the state
∣∣h〉
L
; therefore w = fail.
2. L is not in the state
√
1
5
∣∣h〉
L
+
√
4
5
∣∣t〉
L
; therefore
w = ok.
3. I am uncertain about the outcome of W’s measure-
ment.
In this Gedankenexperiment, that would essentially be
all W would have to do. But imagine a case where this
inference were just one step in a longer chain of reason-
ing. If basing subsequent inferences on the result of this
one, we expect SPS to apply in the following sense: Op-
erationally, the most general discrimination protocol of
this kind can be implemented by interacting L with some
auxiliary system and then performing a sharp projective
measurement on the latter, with respect to some basis.
So long as the result of this inference is part of the rea-
soning premise, SPS could then be enforced by requiring
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that subsequent operations act incoherently relative to
this basis.
In this sense, even though quantum computers are not
restricted by fixed classical bases, we expect the sound-
ness of their reasoning to depend on a variant of SPS ap-
plied on the “effective classical bases” determined by all
the premises on which any given inference is based. We
expect there to be a rich landscape of possible branch-
ing structures (including nested branches, opening and
closing of the scope of a subordinate premise within that
of another, etc.) and formal rules for the mutual com-
patibility of premises. We leave this avenue for future
work.
F. Arbitrating FR’s casino dispute
To close this section on a lighter note, we revisit a puz-
zle FR posed after proving their main theorem. Suppose
their Gedankenexperiment is a casino’s gambling game,
with W the gambler and the rest of the agents casino
employees. The rules stipulate a reward to the gambler
if r = heads, and a penalty if r = tails.
On an instance where w = ok and w = ok are observed,
W might reason, via the non-SPS reasoning we reviewed
in Section VA, that r must have landed tails. On the
other hand, W might aver that their outcome w = ok
proves that the state of S before F’s measurement was
not |→〉S, and that therefore r must have been heads.
How is the dispute to be resolved?
By now, it is eminently clear that the game formulated
as such is not operationally sound: its rules are based on
extra-operational details of interpretation. As such, both
the parties are to blame for entering into an ambiguous
arrangement. Yet, if we had to find the closest approx-
imation to resolving the dispute, we would recommend
applying the principle of virtual disclosure. As we saw in
Section VC, this would uphold F’s situational reasoning
and reject that of W. In connection with the dispute, the
court should then award the case to W, whose reasoning
is compatible with the former.
Complications would arise, though, if F—themselves
a casino employee—weighed in on the matter. F might
protest that they distinctly recall seeing the outcome r =
tails. Nevertheless, as we saw in Section IV, in order
for the game to work as designed, F would have had to
cede their cognitive agency entirely for its duration. The
court should deem F to thereby have relinquished their
eligibility to act as a sound-minded witness to any events
that transpired at the time. Hence, overall our principles
of SPS and virtual disclosure would lean in favour of the
hapless gambler W. We might rule that the casino pay
W their legal expenses (but not the stipulated reward);
serve the casino a stern warning that it will be heavily
penalized if it continues to lure unsuspecting gamblers
into operationally ill-defined games; and strongly advise
W to gamble more responsibly henceforth.
VI. SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK
When rational agents try to reason in situations where
their very minds are in quantum superposition states,
they can quickly run into paradoxes. If the “Wigner’s
friend” Gedankenexperiment offered a glimpse of this
predicament, Frauchiger and Renner (FR)’s “Wigners’
friends” extension [2] has exposed its convoluted innards.
FR interpreted their technical result as an impossibil-
ity for quantum mechanics to consistently describe its
own use in reasoning. This definitive verdict, however,
has been challenged by later authors. Unfortunately,
much of the discourse on this topic has used the terminol-
ogy and technical machinery of particular interpretations
of quantum mechanics, such as the de Broglie–Bohm in-
terpretation, QBism, and consistent histories. Elsewhere,
authors have brought to bear tools from the field of for-
mal languages and modal logic.
We offer this work as a humble attempt to strip the
issue of all interpretational elements, frame it opera-
tionally, study it in a language and formalism accessi-
ble to experts in the broad field of quantum information
science, and make some novel contributions.
Our main contribution is an operational principle to
aid rational agents in making inferences. Called super-
positional solipsism (SPS), this principle prescribes that
an agent reason based on the premise that their current
mental or observational state is definite and not part of
a superposition.
We showed that SPS leads to operationally-sound in-
ferences in all instances where an agent has any agency
to reason. Furthermore, we showed that a failure to re-
spect SPS leads to a weakening in an agent’s predictive
power or, worse, a breakdown of rational soundness. We
used the FR Gedankenexperiment as a test case to un-
cover various attractive features of SPS, including its op-
erational simplicity. We also used this opportunity to
explore subtleties that might have been missed in past
work, particularly those concerning rational agency.
We also demonstrated that neglecting SPS leads agents
to reason based on fallacious assumptions that amount
to a violation of the no-signalling principle or of the oper-
ational informational completeness of the wavefunction.
Moving beyond human-like agents that have well-defined
“observational states”, we offered some clues as to how
to generalize this concept to the case of fully quantum
agents such as quantum computers. We surmise that
each situation where such an agent needs to make an
inference naturally offers certain “effective observational
states”, associated with the situational premises. In fu-
ture work, we hope to undertake the project of further
formalizing the notions we introduced, particularly in
connection with fully quantum agents. It might also be
worth exploring if our concept of “transmissive stability”
of logical statements can itself be elevated to some sort
of axiomatic principle to replace SPS.
Also worth exploring are possible forms in which our
ideas have already been presented by others before. We
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expect the framework of compatible observables and con-
textuality to be a likely source of such precedent: SPS
could be equivalent to the principle that mutually-incom-
patible observables cannot be simultaneously assigned
definite values. Likewise, the notions of “trust” and
“scope” introduced in [11] could be related to the mech-
anism through which SPS qualifies FR’s Axiom (C).
Familiarity with the formalism might have trained
physicists to expect coherent superpositional elements to
be critical to quantum-mechanical reasoning. Indeed,
much of the response to FR’s inconsistency result, in
scholarly literature and on internet discussions alike, has
hinted that their fictional agents’ situational negligence
of alternate branches of the wavefunction might be the
fatal fallacy underlying the inconsistency. Remarkably,
our work shows that the fallacy lies at the opposite ex-
treme: agents really should be reasoning in staunch obliv-
ion of branches of the wavefunction they don’t experi-
ence—even ones they expect to be present by design!
Thus, the lay human intuition that reasons “classi-
cally” might well offer pragmatic and operational ben-
efits. It would be interesting to investigate whether such
benefits played a role in the evolution of our oft-lamented
classical intuition. More generally, it is intriguing why
there are particular observational states, or “classical
bases”, with respect to which we experience conscious-
ness. Could there be other, fundamentally different, ways
in which conscious agents could evolve to experience the
same reality? Would we notice these agents? What are
the possible mechanisms through which an entity could
acquire—as we seem to have—a “working understand-
ing” of quantum mechanics despite lacking an “intuitive
understanding”? Inquiry into such questions might ben-
efit from an approach similar to Mu¨ller’s [17].
A related avenue for foundational research, which has
already received some attention, is regarding agency. In a
world governed by Schro¨dinger’s unitary dynamics, what
does agency even mean, and how does it emerge and per-
sist? If “superagents” were pulling our strings, would we
be able to tell—say, by virtue of “miracle”-like aberra-
tions a` la “The Matrix”?
As a final note, we raise the question, “Why should
we expect quantum mechanics to have built-in mecha-
nisms to keep our reasoning sound?” Perhaps it takes
constant work and vigilance to get our thinking straight,
but perhaps that’s alright. Perhaps quantum mechan-
ics can consistently describe its own use—if only we take
care that it does!
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Appendix A: The FR Gedankenexperiment
Here we will introduce the Gedankenexperiment devised by Frauchiger and Renner (FR). We will paraphrase FR’s
account in a way that, to the best of our judgement, does not conflict with their original intent.
The experiment involves four agents—F, F, W, and W. Agents F and F each have access to their respective
quantum-mechanical lab (whose contents will become clear by context). Meanwhile, W is a “superagent” over F in
the following sense: W has full quantum-mechanical control on the system L, defined as F’s entire lab including its
resident agent F ; likewise, W is a superagent over F.
The experiment proceeds by repeating a set sequence of operations (“round”) indefinitely until a certain condition
is met (like a “while loop” in a computer program). A typical round n consists of the following operations, each
carried out at a specific time index6 within the round:
1. At time n:00, Agent F prepares a qubit R in the pure state
|init〉R :=
√
1
3
|heads〉R +
√
2
3
|tails〉R , (A1)
where {|heads〉R , |tails〉R} is an orthonormal basis over R’s Hilbert space.
2. At time n:10, F measures R in the {|heads〉R , |tails〉R} basis using a device D (WLOG, a qubit identical to R),
makes a mental note of the outcome, and proceeds to prepare another qubit, S, in a state conditional on the
outcome. This results in the following multipartite state:
|ψ〉RDFS :=
√
1
3
|heads〉R
∣∣h〉
D
∣∣h〉
F
|↓〉S +
√
2
3
|tails〉R
∣∣t〉
D
∣∣t〉
F
|→〉S . (A2)
Here, {|↑〉S , |↓〉S} is an orthonormal basis over S’s Hilbert space, and |→〉S =
√
1
2
|↑〉S +
√
1
2
|↓〉S. We follow FR
in assigning a pure state7 to F at their having noted one or the other outcome; these two states of F are also
assumed to be fully informed about the outcome, and consequently, mutually orthogonal.
3. At time n:15, F sends S to F’s lab.
4. At time n:20, F uses a device D to measure S in the {|↑〉S , |↓〉S} basis and makes a mental note of the outcome,
resulting in the state8
|φ〉RDFSDF :=
√
1
3
(|heads〉R ∣∣h〉D ∣∣h〉F |↓〉S ∣∣− 12〉D ∣∣− 12〉F
+ |tails〉R
∣∣t〉
D
∣∣t〉
F
|↓〉S
∣∣− 1
2
〉
D
∣∣− 1
2
〉
F
+ |tails〉R
∣∣t〉
D
∣∣t〉
F
|↑〉S
∣∣ 1
2
〉
D
∣∣ 1
2
〉
F
)
= :
√
1
3
(∣∣h〉
L
∣∣− 1
2
〉
L
+
∣∣t〉
L
∣∣− 1
2
〉
L
+
∣∣t〉
L
∣∣ 1
2
〉
L
)
, (A3)
where L consists of SDF and L of RDF, respectively. Note that
〈
h
∣∣ t〉
L
= 〈1
2
∣∣− 1
2
〉
L
= 0.
5. At time n:30, W uses device E to measure L with respect to the orthonormal basis
{∣∣ok〉
L
,
∣∣fail〉
L
}
, where∣∣ok〉
L
:=
√
1
2
(∣∣h〉
L
−
∣∣t〉
L
)
and
∣∣fail〉
L
:=
√
1
2
(∣∣h〉
L
+
∣∣t〉
L
)
. Subsequently, W makes a mental note and an
announcement of the outcome of this measurement. At this stage the state is
|ξ〉LEWL :=
√
2
3
[∣∣fail〉
L
∣∣fail〉
E
∣∣fail〉
W
∣∣− 1
2
〉
L
+
1
2
(∣∣fail〉
L
∣∣fail〉
E
∣∣fail〉
W
−
∣∣ok〉
L
∣∣ok〉
E
∣∣ok〉
W
) ∣∣ 1
2
〉
L
]
, (A4)
where the Hilbert spaces of E and W are spanned by orthonormal vectors corresponding to the eponymous ones
of L.
6 Our time indices differ slightly from those of FR, without loss of
essence.
7 While this assignment probably does not reflect the complex
workings of agents such as ourselves, it is benign and perfectly
acceptable in the spirit of the Gedankenexperiment.
8
{∣∣ 1
2
〉
D
,
∣∣
−
1
2
〉
D
}
and
{∣∣ 1
2
〉
F
,
∣∣
−
1
2
〉
F
}
are orthonormal bases over
the Hilbert spaces of D and F, respectively.
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6. At time n:40, W uses device E to measure L with respect to the orthonormal basis {|ok〉L , |fail〉L}, where
|ok〉L :=
√
1
2
(∣∣− 1
2
〉
L
−
∣∣ 1
2
〉
L
)
and |fail〉L :=
√
1
2
(∣∣− 1
2
〉
L
+
∣∣ 1
2
〉
L
)
. Finally, W makes a mental note and an
announcement of the outcome. The final state is
|ζ〉LEWLEW :=
√
1
3
[ ∣∣fail〉
L
∣∣fail〉
E
∣∣fail〉
W
(|ok〉L |ok〉E |ok〉W + |fail〉L |fail〉E |fail〉W)
+
1
2
(∣∣ok〉
L
∣∣ok〉
E
∣∣ok〉
W
−
∣∣fail〉
L
∣∣fail〉
E
∣∣fail〉
W
)
(|ok〉L |ok〉E |ok〉W − |fail〉L |fail〉E |fail〉W)
]
= :
√
1
12
[∣∣ok〉
LEW
|ok〉LEW −
∣∣ok〉
LEW
|fail〉LEW +
∣∣fail〉
LEW
|ok〉LEW + 3
∣∣fail〉
LEW
|fail〉LEW
]
, (A5)
where all the newly-named vectors have contextually-evident meanings.
The outcomes of the measurements carried out by F, F, W, and W are represented in [2] by the symbols r, z, w and
w. The above sequence of operations is repeated until both W and W observe their respective “ok” outcomes in the
same round. As can be seen from the form of the final state |ζ〉LEWLEW, this condition has the nonzero probability 112
of occurring in any given round. It is therefore certain to be satisfied on some finite round n, whereat the experiment
halts.
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